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People write books for children and other people write about the books written for children but I don’t 
think it’s for the children at all. I think that all the people who worry so much about the children are 
really worrying about themselves, about keeping their world together and getting the children to help 
them do it . . . .
Since its publication in 1984, Jacqueline Rose’s  
The Case of Peter Pan, or The Impossibility of 
Children’s Fiction has been something of a thorn in 
the side of many who work with children’s literature, 
although not all: Karín Lesnik-Oberstein has been 
prominent in assenting, while others, notably Perry 
Nodelman, have become partial apologists for 
Rose.1 For many, though, there remains a concern 
with the way Rose addresses problems of identity 
and representation—specifically, a concern that 
representations of the child have been rendered so 
suspect as to leave a literature actually for children 
struggling to escape from its apparent impossibility.
I am going to do something a little unusual in 
this paper and reapproach this problem through 
its consideration within a fiction for adults. Russell 
Hoban is probably better known for his sixty works for 
children (notable among which are The Mouse and His 
Child and the Frances the Badger series) than for his 
sixteen novels for adults (the most acclaimed of which 
is Riddley Walker). Turtle Diary is clearly informed 
by Hoban’s work in children’s fiction and features a 
children’s author as one of its two protagonists. Though 
not overtly about children—it is centred, rather, on 
relationships with animals—the book’s commentary on 
children’s literature and its analogies between animals 
—Russell Hoban, Turtle Diary
After Jacqueline Rose, What Is Left?  
The Play of Identity and Representation  
in Russell Hoban’s Turtle Diary
—Graeme Wend-Walker
Jeunesse: Young People, Texts, Cultures 4.1 (2012)16 Graeme Wend-Walker
and children suggest that this story, ostensibly about 
two adults trying to decide whether to free some turtles 
from the London Zoo, is also about children’s interests, 
their representation, and the implications of these for 
the construction of adult identity. It speaks thus to 
certain of the theoretical concerns that would occupy 
Rose almost a decade after the novel’s publication in 
1975. In Hoban’s engagement with these concerns, 
however, he also recognizes and explores—in a way 
that Rose does not—the practical consequences of a 
line of inquiry that ends in impossibility. In the process, 
he addresses a question often implicit in objections to 
Rose: “After impossibility, what is left?” (Owen 258).
If Turtle Diary can be read as a “response” to Rose, 
however, it is a response of a very different order. As 
a fiction composed of its protagonists’ private (and 
frequently contradictory) thoughts—“disconcertingly 
intimate,” Christine Wilkie calls it (46)2—Hoban’s novel 
is not obliged to reconcile its parts monologically the 
way a work of theory is. Its value to us here lies rather 
in its free-ranging, pointedly disunified exploration 
of the complex tensions within which relationships 
to an Other are negotiated in lived experience. It is, 
in a sense, a document of intellectual deviancy and 
perversity. (It might even be called a work of anti-
theory, though on the understanding that much going 
by that name has been concerned to trouble theory 
from within and not simply to oppose it.3) Each of its 
protagonists is engaged in a struggle to find a basis 
for ethical and personally meaningful action in the 
face of just that impossibility described by Rose—in 
essence, the impossibility of overcoming the self’s 
interests in producing representations of an Other. 
Taking impossibility, thus, not as a terminus but as a 
starting point, Hoban situates his adult protagonists’ 
self-theorizing within a context of “real world” 
implications and consequences both for the self and for 
the Other—whether that Other is the child, the animal, 
or children’s literature itself as an Other to the theory 
that interpellates it. In considering these texts side by 
side, this paper considers how Hoban’s exploration 
of these impossible relations suggests ways in which 
impossibility might be recast as provisionality, and 
how it points to the recovery of play as a means and 
condition of moving beyond intellectual cul-de-sacs 
into an open-ended encounter with the Other.
Rose’s position is that “children’s fiction builds 
an image of the child inside the book . . . in order to 
secure the child who is outside the book, the one  
who does not come so easily within its grasp” (2).  
Children’s literature, in this sense, is never really “for” 
children at all (1). It denotes an “impossible” category 
built on “the impossible relation between child and 
adult,” impossible because “[t]here is no child behind 
the category ‘children’s fiction,’ other than the one 
which the category itself sets in place, the one which  
it needs to believe is there for its own purposes”  
(1, 10). Childhood is constructed as a site of mythical 
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origin, as a “primitive or lost state to which the child 
has special access”; consequently, the child is rendered 
as “something of a pioneer who restores these worlds 
to us, and gives them back to us with a facility or 
directness which ensures that our own relationship to 
them is, finally, safe” (9). This construction is supposed 
to “guarantee a certain knowledge of ourselves”  
that will thereby deny “the anxieties we have about  
our own psychic, sexual and social being in the  
world” (xvii). 
Rose insists she does not mean that all such writing 
should actually stop or that some alternate, ideal form 
of writing might exist that she would promote in its 
place (140). For many of her readers, though, there 
remains a feeling that, while she may be correct (up to 
some point or other), she leaves little indication as to 
how children’s writing and the work around it might 
in fact proceed. The situation has been summarized by 
Gabrielle Owen:
Perhaps what troubles us most about Rose’s book 
is the word impossible. It is right there in the title, 
taunting us. She is talking to us. She is talking 
about us. And it sounds like she is saying that our 
parenting is impossible, our teaching impossible, 
our reading and writing for children impossible. 
It is of little comfort that Rose does not mean this 
literally. . . . What does it mean, then, to be in an 
impossible relation? And where does that leave 
us as critics, as writers of children’s books, or as 
parents and teachers who work with children every 
day? These are questions about the lived reality of 
her claims. . . . After impossibility, what is left? (258)
Owen acknowledges the kind of work being done by 
Lesnik-Oberstein and others, for whom “the ‘child’” 
is always first and foremost “a construction,” and for 
whom the primary task is always to deconstruct the 
various ways in which it is supposed “that children 
exist and can be known” (Lesnik-Oberstein 9). 
As Owen argues, however, such work “privileges 
certain kinds of questions while making others seem 
irrelevant,” effacing in particular a set of difficult but 
equally vital questions pertaining to practical necessity 
(266). She suggests that, as scholars, “we might do 
better to acknowledge the dialectic between working 
out how to think about something and what to do 
about something” (266). 
The negotiation of just such a dialectic troubles the 
two protagonists of Turtle Diary. They have reached 
impasses in their lives and spend a great deal of time 
thinking about things—even about doing things—but 
comparatively little actually doing anything. William 
G., a divorced former account executive now working 
in a bookstore and living in a bedsit, has exhausted 
himself with thinking. “The mind moves ahead of 
every action making me tired in advance of whatever 
I do,” he complains, finding “[n]o place for the self 
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to sit down and catch its breath” (85). The equally depressive 
Neaera H., an unmarried children’s author and illustrator, has 
become both unable and unwilling to continue writing children’s 
books, largely because she suspects that writing for children is, 
indeed, impossible. Turtle Diary thus situates the work done with 
children’s literature within the “lived reality” of a general being-
in-the-world, where “impossibility,” Hoban suggests, might be 
found anywhere one looks for it. It demonstrates, moreover, that 
critical thinking (at least, in certain circumstances and modes) 
can become a kind of “doing” in itself, one liable to obscure and 
displace “the things that really need attention paid to them” (44). 
Comparisons between Hoban’s commentary on children’s 
literature in essays and interviews and Neaera’s opinions in  
Turtle Diary suggest that the latter’s concerns are substantively 
his own. He has frequently complained, in particular, about the 
adult representation of children’s interests. He argues that  
“[w]hat we call education is mostly training for approved 
behaviour” (“Time Slip” 42) and protests the use teachers make 
of children’s books, including his own, condemning it as a form 
of “industrialization”: “I don’t want ‘We’ve done two units on 
you’” (“Russell Hoban” 104). In his view, the extraction of use 
value is just one of the many means by which “most of us, as 
adults, impair our children’s capacity for being . . . without 
meaning to” (“Time Slip” 43). Children doing “units” are taught 
to displace the intrinsic value of experience, something found 
not in formalized learning but in “hereness”—a condition of 
receptivity favouring open-endedness, experimentation, and “a 
search for usable truths, truths that satisfy real needs and real 
wants” (“Time Slip” 33, 34). Citing John Holt’s How Children Fail, 
Turtle Diary thus situates the 
work done with children’s 
literature within the 
“lived reality” of a general 
being-in-the-world, where 
“impossibility,” Hoban 
suggests, might be found 
anywhere one looks for it.
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Hoban argues that the interests of parents and teachers 
in childhood often displace this open-endedness and 
“hereness” with an anxious urgency, justified in terms 
of the child’s continuing development, to move from 
the moment to what the adult supposes ought to come 
after it (“Time Slip” 43–45). Children subjected to this 
anxiety, he holds, begin to “lean forward mentally, lean 
uphill and feel tired” (44). Eventually, they grow up to 
become anxious adults themselves; children obliged 
to do “units” become adults trained to “produce 
‘product,’” their adult lives thus becoming “endless 
repetitions of childhood defeats” (“Russell Hoban” 104; 
“Time Slip” 42). He is most optimistic when speaking 
of children’s resistance to this: “That so much of our 
educating is being rejected and vomited up by the 
children it is stuffed into is one of the most hopeful 
signs in a not very hopeful-looking time. It shows the 
stubborn health of the human soul” (“Time Slip” 42).
This concern with the impingement of adult 
anxieties on childhood is apparent in the first pages of 
Turtle Diary. Visiting the London Zoo and observing 
the animals caged there, William offers impressionistic 
reports that juxtapose animals with the children 
taken to see them, contrasting an apparent state of 
anarchy (of animalhood, of childhood) with alienating 
mechanisms of structure and control: “Over the bridge 
past the Aviary towering high against the sky, a huge 
pointy steel-mesh thing of gables and angles full of 
strange cries and dark flappings. There were little  
shrill children eating things” (7). William visits the 
aquarium, where he finds sea turtles contained in 
“shabby,” “grotty” conditions—a “glass box of  
second-hand ocean,” he calls it—but he observes  
them seemingly refuting their imprisonment,  
“[s]oaring, dipping and curving with flippers like 
wings” (8). Beside them in the dark tunnels of the 
aquarium and similarly corralled, children likewise 
persist in spontaneous expressions of “hereness,” 
defying the imposition of learning and embracing 
instead the surrounding darkness: “People black against 
the windows murmuring, explaining to children, 
holding them up, putting them down, urging them 
on, calling them back. Echoing footsteps of children 
running in the dark” (8). Leaving the aquarium, William 
reflects despondently on the predicament of a gorilla 
in a cage: “I couldn’t think what was worse: if he could 
remember or if he couldn’t” (8). Then, waiting for the 
bus home, he watches a child playing with a rubber 
gorilla suspended on a piece of elastic. Bouncing it 
into a puddle on the pavement, the boy seems to be 
exploring, as William himself has just been doing, 
ideas and feelings of his relationship to gorillaness. 
The image recalls Freud’s famous “fort/da,” the game 
of “gone” and “there” in which a child negotiates 
between selfhood and otherness by repeatedly casting 
away an object and drawing it back on a piece of 
string (8–9). It recalls, too, the anxiety of those adults 
to whom this play had seemed a “disturbing habit” 
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and something to be ended (8). This is echoed in the 
closing words of Hoban’s chapter when the boy’s 
mother reprimands him: “Stop that,” she says to him. “I 
told you to stop that” (8). It is clear that this child is not 
permitted to explore his relationship to an Other in a 
state of “hereness”—that is to say, in terms that speak to 
his own inquiry—but is to remain, as it were, dutifully 
pressed to the glass in silence. The reader, moreover, is 
left to wonder whether the child might come to share 
the gorilla’s fate—whether this metaphorical caging 
might likewise lead him to forget where he has come 
from, to forget what it is to be a child. The chapter 
thus frames the central concerns of the novel: we note 
William’s concerns about the adult construction of 
children’s interests, repeated in the image of caged 
animals that either are defeated by their conditions or 
else survive by defying them, but we also see his own 
incapacitating anxiety in respect to this. “[W]hen I was 
a child I used to like the Zoo,” he says (8), but now he 
sees evidence only of his own alienation, of himself 
as a defeated child. Overwhelmed by impossibility, he 
can think only in terms of “what was worse.”
Independently of each other, William and Neaera 
become troubled by the captivity of the sea turtles, and 
each begins fantasizing about stealing the turtles and 
setting them free in the ocean. They become aware of 
each other’s preoccupations and agree to collaborate 
on a rescue. In the process of doing so, each spends 
considerable time reflecting on problems of identity 
and representation, primarily in relation to the turtles 
themselves, but also in regard to the other birds and 
animals they encounter in trips to the Zoo, as well  
as in films, poetry, photographs, and book illustrations. 
Indeed, the central plot of Turtle Diary—the freeing of 
the turtles—makes up a relatively small portion  
of the text, the majority of which is an almost  
stream-of-consciousness articulation, through 
alternating chapters, of each character’s struggle to 
produce a coherent sense of selfhood in relation to  
the animal Other.
William and Neaera are motivated to free the 
turtles because they believe that it is unethical to keep 
imprisoned indefinitely an animal that, they suppose, 
would otherwise be pursuing its natural impulse 
to swim fourteen hundred miles to its Ascension 
Island breeding grounds—that the turtles “can find 
something and they are not being allowed to do it” 
(42). Subtending this, however, is a hope that freeing 
the turtles will somehow free them as well, that it will 
launch them into their own sense of selfhood, purpose, 
and direction. Yet their incapacitation repeats itself 
even within their effort to find a way out of it. They 
lapse, at times, into an almost obsessive self-analysis 
of their motives and objectives, repeatedly questioning 
whether it is reasonable to make the turtles symbolic of 
their own feelings of being caged (or of their desires to 
be free from such feeling) or reasonable to suppose that 
one could, in fact, ever know what is actually good 
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for the turtles. In wrestling with these questions, they 
oscillate between anthropomorphizing and striving  
to open to these animals’ alterity, between investing  
their identity in relationships with them and 
questioning their interests in doing so, and they 
struggle between these poles to find a basis for ethical 
action: “There is no place for me to find. No beach,  
no breeding grounds,” decides Neaera at one point, 
asking herself: “Do I owe the turtles more or less 
because of that?” (43).
She and William manage, in the end, to carry their 
plan through to success. Yet they do so without ever 
resolving their highly conflicted feelings about their 
relationship to this Other, and Turtle Diary finally 
suggests that a coherent objectification of the problem 
might not be possible, or even desirable. Hoban, I 
think, would agree with Owen’s conclusion about 
adult relationships with children: that “[t]he project 
of determining what it is the child really wants is not 
something that can be done in generalized terms, or in 
a book of academic scholarship, but only something 
that can be partially and contingently known in a 
fleeting exchange between one person (maybe a child) 
and another (maybe an adult)” (261). Neaera’s and 
William’s moments of clarity in action are always 
of this kind: always fleeting, always bounded by 
seemingly irreconcilable impulses and conclusions. 
While none of the positions they oscillate between is 
able to provide in itself the answers they are looking 
for, their multiple, conflicted notions nonetheless 
represent in their totality what the novel would seem 
finally to advocate, which is the possibility of an 
open-ended play with representations of the Other—a 
play in which everything is permissible, even if only 
within the privacy of one’s own head. If one were to 
draw from the novel a single image for this, it might 
be of the boy “danc[ing] the little black gorilla up and 
down” (8). This is, in effect, what William and Neaera 
are doing all along, though their anxiety has robbed it 
of the quality of play, of “hereness.” 
To understand how Turtle Diary points toward a 
possibility of ethical action arising from an impossible 
relation between self and Other, we need first to 
consider how their struggle with generalized terms 
impedes the protagonists’ capacity for action.
Problems with Identity and Representation
Turtle Diary situates William’s and Neaera’s 
struggles within a dynamic tension between two 
competing imperatives. The first of these is to assert 
knowledge of the Other: knowledge enables the 
self to become oriented in respect to the Other, so 
that meaningful, ethical action toward it becomes 
possible. Knowledge of the Other might also, to 
borrow from Rose, “guarantee [the protagonists] a 
certain knowledge of [themselves],” denying thereby 
“the anxieties [they] have about [their] own psychic, 
sexual and social being in the world” (xvii). William 
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and Neaera are riddled with such anxieties: “I don’t want to be naked 
with anybody now, especially myself,” discloses William (71), and 
Neaera is similarly discomfited in her relation to herself: “My face 
does not look back at me now when I look into the mirror” (50). 
“Identity is a shaky thing,” she notes (88). When this imperative is 
privileged, the turtles come to represent for them (as children do for 
adults in The Case of Peter Pan) the possibility of an unmediated 
connection to the natural world, to a “primitive or lost state” that 
might be recovered through the Other’s “special access” to it (Rose 9). 
For Neaera, the turtles are “a magical reality, juice of life in a world 
gone dry,” and she feels alienated from the sense of selfhood and 
purpose that reconnection might enable (50). “I’m always afraid of 
being lost,” she says; “the secret navigational art of the turtles seems a 
sacred thing” to her, and she hopes that investment in this sacredness 
might allow her to recover some comparable means of navigating her 
own life (27). When the turtles are considered in these terms, ethical 
behaviour toward them becomes unproblematic; much as children’s 
literature, for Rose, strives to show children what childhood is 
supposed to be, Neaera’s (and William’s) objective is simply to honour 
the turtles’ magical reality by restoring the creatures to their natural 
condition. And precisely because the turtles are already supposed to 
belong to nature (though like children, they still must be returned to 
it), William and Neaera need not consider how their own interests 
might be shaping their representation of the turtles’ interests. Thus, 
watching over the turtles en route to the coast, Neaera can confidently 
assert, “When they felt themselves once more in ocean they would 
simply do what turtles do in ocean, their readiness was whole and 
undiminished in them” (134).
William’s own “fantasy of origins,” of an “ultimate beginning 
William and Neaera find 
themselves haunted then 
by images of the Other of 
the Other—which is to say, 
of the dangers the turtles 
would face if set free.
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where everything is perfect or at least can be made 
good” (Rose 138), leads him to experiment with a 
New Age practice called Original Therapy, in which 
one seeks explicitly to return “to the origin of life” 
(Hoban, Turtle Diary 102). Locked in the practitioner’s 
oxygen-depriving scissors grip, the participant is said 
to journey back beyond “the primordial soup,” arriving 
at “something like the idea of a question, a kind of 
original YES or NO?” and then to a recovery of the 
original “big YES” that gave rise to Being. For William, 
the turtles’ vocabulary is comprised entirely of “YES,” 
and so they perfectly embody the desired absence of 
anxiety. Their minds never move ahead of their actions: 
“Green turtles must have the kind of mind that doesn’t 
think about sharks unless a shark is there” (12).
Such images of the Other prove unstable, however, 
and problems arise when the very effort to deny 
anxiety through identification with the Other results 
instead in a projection of anxieties onto the Other. 
William and Neaera find themselves haunted then by 
images of the Other of the Other—which is to say, of 
the dangers the turtles would face if set free. Dreaming 
of herself as a turtle, “swimming, flying, green ocean 
over me, under me, touching every part of me,” Neaera 
is startled by “a glimmering white shadow coming 
up from below” (76–77).4 The dream reflects her own 
anxiety as a “swimmer”; unlike the turtles, she is prone 
to thinking about metaphorical sharks before they are 
actually there. But it also represents her anxiety about 
acting on behalf of the turtles, which, if released, will 
be exposed to a real threat from sharks on their way 
to Ascension Island, and this concern undermines her 
commitment to freeing them. 
Problems likewise arise when William and Neaera 
find themselves wondering whether it might in fact be 
impossible (to borrow again from Rose) “to invest in 
[the turtles’] sweet self-evidence, impossible to use  
the translucent clarity of [turtles]” to deny their 
anxieties (xvii). “Is my wanting to set the turtles free 
 . . . a trying to pretend that something is when it isn’t?” 
Neaera asks herself, while William doubts whether 
identity really can be grounded in representations of 
the Other: “Why turtles for God’s sake? Helping them 
find what they are looking for won’t bloody help me” 
(35, 70). That the pursuit of identity through a “fantasy 
of origins” might be unhealthy becomes apparent when 
a participant in an Original Therapy session slips into a 
spontaneous rebirthing experience. Hoban points here 
to an association between representations of nature 
and fantasies of an origin in childhood as a “primitive 
or lost state” (Rose 9); when all the other participants 
suddenly want to try this too, William detects “an 
awful lust for infancy” in them (106). Having already 
suspected that there is no way to derive selfhood 
from knowledge of the turtles, “[n]o way to hold the 
sun in the eye, be held by it swimming, swimming” 
(20), and having criticized himself for “having turtle 
fantasies instead of living life” (55), he finds that the 
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act of freeing the turtles has failed to consolidate his 
identity in relation to them: “I felt absurd, couldn’t find 
a place to put myself in relation to the three turtles 
now in the sea. What in the world did it all mean?” 
(148). “Launching the turtles didn’t launch me,” he 
concludes. “You can’t do it with turtles” (172). 
Such doubts give rise to a conflicting imperative, 
marking the opposite pole, as it were, of the 
representational problem: to withdraw the self from 
projection onto the Other so that the Other can be 
known as it is in itself, unfalsified by one’s interests 
in it. Privileging this imperative, William and Neaera 
reveal an awareness of the effects of representation. 
Neaera, for instance, critiques the form of 
representation that is the display of animals at the zoo. 
Observing oystercatchers, she realizes that they have 
paradoxically been rendered “so accessible as to be 
unobservable,” for their imprisonment by display has 
obscured the reality of these birds as she has known 
them in nature, “from a distance on the open mudflats 
with a wide and low horizon far away” (24). The Other, 
she finds, can only be known by releasing it from the 
captivity of one’s investment in it.
Problems arise here, too, however. In questioning 
her tendency to anthropomorphize, Neaera discovers 
that her critique has merely constituted another 
form of representation. “The birds,” she suddenly 
realizes, “were not silent prisoners wasting away 
like Dr Manette in the Bastille nor were they beating 
pitiful wings against the wire mesh of their captivity” 
(25). Such insights leave her with no foundation for 
knowledge at all, and this too erodes conviction in 
freeing the turtles: “Perhaps they no longer want the 
ocean and I’m wrong to impose my feelings on them” 
(59). Even after choosing to free them, she continues 
to feel overwhelmed by the impossibility of adequately 
withdrawing the self: “I shall never be able to stand 
far enough back to see the whole picture. I shall die 
in blind ignorance and rage” (156). William similarly 
expresses the impossibility of knowing the Other 
without representation: “Prisons are all we know how 
to make,” he says (20).
Yet more troubling to them is the possibility that 
an absolute openness to alterity—should such a state 
actually be possible—might leave the Other merely 
blank and without definition. Rendered ultimately 
unknowable, the Other would present no meaningful 
way to act in respect to it—would present, in fact, 
nothing at all. Identity, moreover, might find itself 
positively at risk of annihilation, for the unknowability 
of the Other makes the knowing of any self—including 
one’s own self—impossible. The opening chapter of 
Turtle Diary, as noted above, presents the Other (child 
and animal) as partially captured by representation, 
but these same passages also present a converse 
predicament in which the spectre of the Other’s 
immediate presence portends a profound threat to 
being. William’s visit to the zoo is precipitated by 
Jeunesse: Young People, Texts, Cultures 4.1 (2012) 25Graeme Wend-Walker
a dream in which he is haunted by the presence of 
an octopus. In the morning, he hunts for pictures at 
the bookstore, but finds here too that the octopus’s 
otherness overwhelms him: “Their eyes are dreadful to 
look at. I shouldn’t like to be looked at by an octopus 
no matter how small and harmless it might be. To be 
stared at by those eyes would be altogether too much 
for me, would leave me nothing whatever to be” (7). 
He is nonetheless compelled to visit the zoo, anxious 
to see one—as if the obliteration of the self would 
provide at least some kind of answer to the problem 
of a shaky identity. Neaera is similarly anxious about 
turtles and equally compelled to encounter one: 
“I’d been aware of the turtles for some time before 
I went to look at them. I knew I’d have to do it but I 
kept putting it off. When I did go to see them I didn’t 
know how to cope with it. Untenable propositions 
assembled themselves in my mind. If these were what 
they were then why were buildings, buses, streets?” 
(26–27). She finds, when thinking this way, that things 
become “all blank and baffling” (88), and William has 
a similar experience: “I dreamt that nothing had a front 
any more. The whole world was nothing but . . . utter 
blankness. . . . Just blank terror” (78–79). Thus, while 
both feel that it ought to be possible, somehow, simply 
to be, to leave the world alone in its being and to know 
the self in respect to it, neither has any idea how to 
resolve the intellectualizing of such notions into a way 
of actually living in regard to the Other.
Problems with Children’s Literature
These concerns regarding children, animals, and 
representation coalesce around Neaera’s writer’s block. 
As the reader and Neaera herself come to realize, her 
problem is no mere lack of inspiration. Rather, creative 
writing has come to seem less a way of engaging with 
the world than of occluding it: “Suddenly I don’t know, 
haven’t the faintest idea how people make up stories 
about anything,” she says. “Anything is whatever it 
happens to be, why on earth make up stories” (42).  
She objects in particular to literary representations  
of animals: 
I think there is less merit in Gerard Manley 
Hopkins’s poem “The Windhover” than there would 
have been in not writing it. I think that Basho’s frog 
that jumped into the old pond has more falcon in 
it than Hopkins’s bird, simply because it has more 
things-as-they-are, which includes falcons and 
everything else. [Windhovers] don’t want mannered 
words but only the simplest and fewest, certainly 
nothing longer than a haiku and preferably no 
words at all. (41)
Her own picture books have centred on a series of 
animal characters, and she comes to feel that Delia 
Swallow and Gillian Vole (who recall Hoban’s own 
Frances the Badger) ought not to have any more written 
about them, either. She has been keeping a water 
Jeunesse: Young People, Texts, Cultures 4.1 (2012)26 Graeme Wend-Walker
beetle in an aquarium in the hope that the observation of it might inspire 
a new story, but she suspects that Madame Beetle has thereby become a 
prisoner no less than the turtles in the Zoo—“the prisoner of my flagging 
invention,” she calls her—and that this use of her amounts to “insect 
exploitation” (51, 129). The animals she has been observing, she decides, 
are far more interesting in themselves than what she has been doing with 
them: “What I do is not as good as what an oyster-catcher does. Writing 
and illustrating books for children is not as good as walking orange-eyed, 
orange-billed in the distance on a river, on the beaches of the ocean, 
finding shellfish. And of course they fly as well which must be worth a good 
deal” (49). Of Madame Beetle, she concludes: “I can’t think now how it 
could have occurred to me that I might write a story about her. Who am I 
to use the mystery of her that way? Her swimming is better than my writing 
and she doesn’t expect to get paid for it” (76).
There is an echo here of the line in Rousseau’s Émile, which Rose uses 
as an epigraph for her second chapter—“Let there be no other book but 
the world”—and of the first lines from Émile, which Rose quotes later: 
“Everything is perfect, coming from the hands of the Creator; every thing 
degenerates in the hands of man” (qtd. in Rose 42, 44). In Rousseau and in 
the writing that comes after him, childhood is, as Rose notes, represented 
as “a primitive state where ‘nature’ is still to be found if only one gets to 
it in time” (44). While Rousseau holds that education, though itself an 
artificial process, is justified because without it “the child would be even 
more totally disfigured by social institutions,” Neaera has no such faith that 
the ends might justify writing as a means. Given that animal characters in 
picture books are often stand-ins for children, her wish not to corrupt (her 
relationship to) Madame Beetle’s natural condition might suggest a similar 
desire to sustain the child’s connection to nature as a bulwark against 
cultural degeneracy and the loss of an identity-grounding origin. Unlike 
The resemblance to 
Rose’s argument is clear: 
children’s literature 
attempts to teach 
children how to be 
children and does so to 
deny adult anxieties about 
“being in the world.”
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Rousseau, however, she requires this connection to 
be immediate, untainted by literary supplementation. 
“Anything is whatever it happens to be,” and nothing is 
to stand for anything else.
Ironically, it is this hyper-Rousseauean distrust 
of writing that leads to Neaera’s strongest alignment 
with Rose. Increasingly discomfited by her own work 
as a children’s author, she becomes invested instead 
in literary criticism; inebriated at a party, she finds 
herself “going on and on” to a publisher about classic 
literature and children’s literature, about “Thebes 
and Mr McGregor’s garden” (99). Two days later, 
she is surprised to receive a letter from the publisher 
“affirming his strong interest in [her] forthcoming 
From Oedipus to Peter Rabbit: The Tragic Heritage in 
Children’s Literature.” Yet, as much sense as she made 
to herself while drunk and as lucrative as the offer is, 
she discovers that she has misread her own concern 
with tragedy: “On the morning when the letter came 
I was thinking that possibly the biggest tragedy in 
children’s literature is that people won’t stop writing 
it” (99). She discovers misgivings about criticism, too, 
which she realizes (like Rose) merely repeats a problem 
with writing for children (see Rose 2). There follows the 
passage I used for an epigraph to this paper, an extract 
that I quote here in full:
People write books for children and other people 
write about the books written for children but I 
don’t think it’s for the children at all. I think that 
all the people who worry so much about the 
children are really worrying about themselves, 
about keeping their world together and getting the 
children to help them do it, getting the children to 
agree that it is indeed a world. Each new generation 
of children has to be told: “This is a world, this 
is what one does, one lives like this.” Maybe our 
constant fear is that a generation of children will 
come along and say: “This is not a world, this is 
nothing, there’s no way to live at all.” (100)
The resemblance to Rose’s argument is clear: children’s 
literature attempts to teach children how to be children 
and does so to deny adult anxieties about “being in 
the world” (xvii). At the same time, though, it is as if 
Neaera, who distrusts all representation and actually 
does stop writing children’s literature, has anticipated 
Rose’s argument and taken it too much to heart.
That she has thought herself into an intellectual 
cul-de-sac is illustrated through Hoban’s analogical 
interweaving of her reflections on the publishing offer 
and on the representation of animals. Having watched 
a documentary about people who travel the world 
seeking the thrill of diving with great white sharks, 
Neaera becomes angered by the arrogance of these 
divers. They swim without risk, protected by cages, yet 
seem tremendously self-affirmed by the experience. 
She describes them as “frotteurs” and insists that, 
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however close they may think they have got to the 
shark, “they have not really seen him or touched him 
because what he is to man is what he is to naked man 
alone-swimming. They have not found the great white 
shark, they have acted out some brothel fantasy with 
black rubber clothing and steel bars” (98–99). Here too 
is a correspondence with Rose: in much the same way 
that there is “no child behind the category ‘children’s 
fiction,’ other than the one which the category itself 
sets in place,” there is no shark beyond the cage, other 
than the divers’ representations of it. This relation is 
supposed to affirm identity through connection to a 
“primitive or lost state” in a manner “which ensures 
that [the divers’] own relationship to [that state] is, 
finally, safe.” It is a relationship of mastery, in much the 
same way that the scandalous sexuality of the child, 
which likewise threatens to disturb safe boundaries 
(those between adult and child), is contended with not, 
as Freud thought, by “total resistance” to the notion 
of child sexuality, but as Rose says, by making it “an 
object of curiosity and investigation, something to be 
mastered” (15). Evidently feeling herself implicated by 
these notions, Neaera declines the publishing offer and 
abandons her own production of picture books. 
If turtles represent the Other in its benign aspect—
as passively dependent upon one’s ethical action 
(perhaps, as a child might be on an adult’s) and as 
that which might secure one’s identity—then the shark 
is the Other in its opposite guise: requiring nothing, 
devastatingly indifferent to all investment in it, it is 
a perpetual threat to one’s very being. These are two 
sides of the same thing, of course; the turtles have also 
been experienced as a threat to identity that Neaera 
“didn’t know how to cope with,” as a refutation of the 
possibility even of “buildings, buses, [and] streets” 
(26–27), while sharks are likewise both “innocent 
and murderous” (99). (As elsewhere, we find that the 
two poles of the representation problem fold into 
each other.) The problem for Neaera is that, however 
much merit there may be in her critique of the divers, 
it merely substitutes one impossibility for another. It 
establishes an obligation that is impossible for her to 
meet, for only annihilation would follow should she 
better the divers and actually swim naked and alone 
with great white sharks. (The prospect repeats her fear 
that, should adults cease using children to deny their 
anxieties, they might find that “[t]his is not a world, this 
is nothing”—an existential apprehension in both senses 
of the word.) It is not surprising, then, that her dreams 
are haunted by “a glimmering white shadow coming 
up from below,” or that her pursuit of knowledge 
should manifest as a death drive: “the shark’s mouth 
too,” she says, “is after all a place of rest, they call 
them requin” (77). The ending of Turtle Diary describes 
the fate of those who, overwhelmed by impossibility, 
can find no rest but in requin: when the body of the 
despairing Miss Neap (William’s fellow tenant) is found 
hanged in her room, her Book of Common Prayer is 
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open to At the Burial of the Dead at Sea (181).
Neaera and William’s choice, in the end, is a 
Sisyphean one: to free the turtles despite having no 
way of knowing whether this will actually be good 
for the animals and despite their skepticism about the 
implications, if any, for their own sense of identity. As 
mentioned earlier, this uncertainty lingers even after 
the turtles are freed. The uncertainty itself, Hoban 
suggests, is key, however, for in this willingness to 
form a relation with the Other, despite the apparent 
absurdity of doing so, they open most fully to the 
turtles in their alterity: they discover a form of 
relation that is based not in certainty and a denial of 
anxiety, but in a shared condition of uncertainty and 
vulnerability. In their perplexed longing for (rather than 
finding of) a “YES,” they find identity with the turtles’ 
equally incomprehensible drive to cross fourteen 
hundred miles of shark-ridden ocean.
Queering the Space of Representation
If the possibility of ethical action must arise, as 
Turtle Diary suggests, from the uncertain and conflicted 
space between competing imperatives, then the 
occupation of this space seems positively to require a 
degree of inconsistency in constructing representations 
of the Other. Gabrielle Owen suggests that queer 
theory provides a means by which to refigure this 
kind of problem: “Queer lives,” she notes, “are often 
defined by impossibility” in that they “fall outside 
of intelligibility, fall outside of definition, outside 
of what is usually understood as reality” (258). In 
queer theory, the categories of gender and sexuality 
are thus understood “not as stable, but as shifting, 
malleable, and contextual” (255). By considering 
this “theorized complexity as belonging [also] to the 
child” (255), the problem of “impossibility” can be 
relocated to the “ever-present tension between theory 
and identity politics” that is already characteristic of 
“scholarly conversations in feminist studies and queer 
studies” (265)—a tension, put simply, between the 
deconstruction of representations and the assertion of 
real presences. Owen insists on the practical necessity 
of affirming knowledge amid categorical uncertainty: 
while those who work in “education, psychology, 
library science, publishing, and even parenting . . . are 
continually reminded of how little we can know about 
the child,” it nonetheless remains that the work done in 
such fields must “essentialize [children] at times”:  
“[t]he essentializing or ‘knowing’ in this work,” she 
insists, “has a rhetorical immediacy that may be 
necessary to get things done” (266). This is, structurally, 
the same tension presented by Turtle Diary in respect to 
animals, particularly where the very refusal to reduce 
the Other to any particular representation is found, 
paradoxically, to require an image of the Other around 
which to organize this resistance. Even while critiquing 
her “exploitative” use of Madame Beetle, for example, 
Neaera persists in calling the animal by name, an 
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anthropomorphization that repeats the very effacement 
of alterity that Neaera is striving to overcome. Yet, it 
is just this failure to be entirely thorough in doing so 
that enables her to assert the presence of the beetle 
as a subject of empathy and ethics. In the following, 
we see Neaera first essentializing the condition of the 
turtles, then asking herself how they feel in partially 
anthropomorphized terms, then questioning whether 
it is valid to think this way, and then insisting again 
on the qualified essentialism that provides a basis for 
an ethical response: “The essence of it is that they can 
find something and they’re not being allowed to do 
it. . . . How must they feel? Is there a sense in them of 
green ocean, white surf and hot sand? Probably not. 
But there is a drive in them to find it” (43). If there is 
an impossibility really worth emphasizing, perhaps it 
is the impossibility of managing without essentializing; 
the goal cannot be to expunge this, only to ensure that 
it is perpetually balanced “by revision, by exceptions, 
by the exploration of previous misunderstandings and 
inadequate definitions” (Owen 266).
Neaera’s and William’s failure to resolve their 
conflicting views constitutes such a perpetually revised 
“knowing.” There is a certain element of playfulness, 
even, in the way they turn their ideas about, and 
though a sense of this is largely displaced from their 
own anxious self-accounting, it shows through in 
Hoban’s light-handed depiction of their exertions. 
The net effect of this is to affirm a freedom to explore 
one’s relationship to the Other through the broadest 
possible imaginative engagement, to bounce rubber 
gorillas into puddles without that foreclosing anxiety 
in which the mind moves always ahead of its actions. 
Hoban would, it seems, assent also to Owen’s assertion 
that “it is better to savor the gaps, to leave room for 
ways of knowing, being, and interpreting that perhaps 
aren’t what we thought they were, that might turn out 
to be queer, strange, or contradictory” (267). When 
representation emerges from such gaps, it becomes 
not a static way of knowing, but the provisionalized 
product of an open dialogue—of something Hoban 
has elsewhere called a “continuous conversation that 
is trying to happen between everything around us and 
us” (“Pan Lives” 174). This sense of “conversation” is 
not anchored in any language of the self, but rather 
it describes a condition of openness in which the 
“known” becomes open to perpetual disruption 
by whatever is Other to the self. It requires, thus, a 
capacity for what he calls “perceptive ignorance,” 
a condition in which one maintains “a respectful 
relationship to something not fully understood,” 
“respectfully offering the mind to the thing, . . . holding 
the mind open to all of the thing” (“Time Slip” 45; 
“Pan Lives” 176). The need for such openness follows 
from the conditions in which identity is shaped; as 
Owen notes, “identity is not something we arrive at, 
finally, once and for all, but something more fluid and 
contradictory” (267). She cites Judith Butler: “There 
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is always a dimension of ourselves and our relation to others 
that we cannot know, and this not-knowing persists with us as 
a condition of existence and, indeed, of survivability” (15; qtd. 
in Owen 267). An embracing of “not-knowing” marks William’s 
and Neaera’s strongest moments of clarity in respect to the turtles. 
Neaera—refusing to “lean uphill”— decides at one point of their 
plans: “On reflection I really don’t want to understand it better. It 
may be silly and wrong and useless, it may be anything at all but 
it seems to be a thing that I have to do before I can do whatever 
comes after it” (64). Later, as she and William dine together before 
embarking on their journey to the coast, they find themselves 
celebrating an ignorance born as much of mental exhaustion as 
practical necessity—though the moment is undone when anxieties 
about knowledge and responsibility return:
“Do you know anything?” I said. 
  “Not a bloody thing,” she said. 
  “Don’t know what’s best for anybody?” 
  “Not even for myself. Especially not for myself.” 
  “Wonderful,” I said. I raised my glass. “Here’s to not 
knowing anything.” 
  “I’ll drink to that,” she said, and raised her glass. We both 
laughed, it just came out. 
  “Except the turtles,” I said. “We know what’s best for the 
turtles, eh?” 
  “Oh shit,” she said. No laughter. “It seemed to want to 
happen, didn’t it.” 
  “Yes,” I said. “It seemed to want to happen.” Her face was 
sad. (128–29)
When representation 
emerges from such gaps, 
it becomes not a static 
way of knowing, but the 
provisionalized product 
of an open dialogue . . . .
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They press on despite these misgivings, and once 
committed to action, they find themselves experiencing 
that “hereness” which privileges not stabilized 
knowledge, but openness and fluidity: “[J]ust be all the 
way in it and you’re all right,” decides William (138); 
“[I]t seemed all at once that I didn’t need any answers 
to anything. . . . I felt free of myself, unlumbered. . . . 
Everything was what it was and the awareness of it was 
part of it” (142). “Our part in the rhythm of things was 
to put the turtles in the sea and however it went would 
be the way it went,” declares Neaera. “I felt relaxed and 
invulnerable” (140).
Doubts return following the success of the mission, 
but here, too, the novel seems positively to resist the 
kind of closure that might be pursued “in generalized 
terms, or in a book of academic scholarship” (Owen 
261). The closest Hoban will come to a generalized 
statement on the matter is voiced by George Fairbairn 
upon William’s and Neaera’s return. The zookeeper 
responsible for the turtles, George has quietly facilitated 
their plans against their burgeoning apprehensions, and 
he is the model in the novel for an ethics of unanxious 
not-knowing. On first seeing him, William detects 
“an air of decency about him, as if he paid attention 
to the things that really need attention paid to them” 
(44). Fairbairn later tells them: “There’s nothing you 
can do about this, you know. . . . Nothing to be done 
really about animals. Anything you do looks foolish. 
The answer isn’t in us. It’s almost as if we’re put here 
on earth to show how silly they aren’t. I don’t mind. I 
just like being around them” (158). This is, in effect, a 
gentler restatement of a thought expressed earlier in 
existential anguish: “This is not a world, this is nothing, 
there’s no way to live at all” (100). “Nothing to be done” 
means not that nothing can be done (not freeing the 
turtles would have been a doing, too, and Fairbairn 
clearly supports their choice), only that actions must 
be performed, and meaning found, in the absence 
of answers known in advance. Understanding that 
anything one does looks foolish, it becomes possible to 
assert one choice over another. Neaera is thus able to 
conclude that “[i]t had been a good thing to do and not 
a foolish one” (170). 
In opposition to Rose, and despite their lingering 
doubts, William and Neaera finally experience 
moments in which a relationship with the Other, if only 
temporarily, affirms a workable sense of identity and an 
assuagement of their anxieties about being in the world. 
Precisely because Neaera no longer requires the turtles 
to perform this role for her, she is able to find in relation 
with them a moment of qualified assurance:
With my eyes closed I could still see the sunlight. 
For a moment I saw ocean, sharp and real, the 
heaving of the open sea. . . . The turtles would be 
swimming, swimming. It had been a good thing to 
do and not a foolish one. Thinking about the turtles I 
could feel the action of their swimming, the muscle 
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contractions that drove the flippers through the green 
water. All they had was themselves but they would 
keep on going until they found what was in them  
to find. . . .  
  I was in my ocean, this was the only ocean 
there was for me, the dry streets of London. . . . I had 
as much as the turtles: myself. At least I too could die 
on the way to where I wanted to be. (170)
Despite having concluded that “[y]ou can’t do it with 
turtles,” William, too, finds himself moving toward 
“doing it.” Picturing the turtles swimming, “[n]ot 
thinking about it. . . . Just doing it,” he recovers a sense 
of momentum in his own life through reconnection 
to his childhood and to the children lost to him 
through divorce (160). Brawling with an inconsiderate 
fellow tenant he had been too afraid to confront, he 
finds himself, ironically, locked in a scissors grip and 
experiencing the kind of rebirthing that had earlier 
repulsed him. As the oxygen fades, he is surprised to 
discover in himself a “YES,” and suddenly realizes that 
“I was wrong to feel the past no longer mine”; “I was 
umbilically connected to all pasts but why labour it,” 
he jokes (154). Though William’s and Neaera’s triumphs 
are small and qualified, they are triumphs nonetheless. 
“Nothing was better or different and I didn’t think I was 
either,” William declares, “but I didn’t mind being alive 
at the moment. After all who knew what might happen?” 
(190).
Hoban is not arguing only for a benefit to the 
self in acting for the Other, however. As mentioned 
above, Miss Neap’s death represents the fate of those 
overwhelmed by impossibility. The closing of the novel 
around this event is also a reminder, though, that 
inaction has implications beyond the self. This late 
and unexpected disturbance within William’s world 
recontextualizes what has come before; impossible 
relations, we are to understand, are not unique to 
children or animals, but might be found anywhere. The 
fate of the freed turtles remains unknown—as it must, 
for resolution would only precipitate a false teleological 
closure, as if the right answer could have been known in 
advance; if, on the other hand, they had not been freed, 
there might be no way to discern then either whether 
this choice had done them harm or good. But if  
“[n]othing to be done” does not mean that nothing can 
be done, neither does it mean that there are not “things 
that really need attention paid to them.” At the coroner’s 
hearing, William and his fellow tenants are embarrassed 
to hear that, in making her funeral arrangements, Miss 
Neap had reported that she lived alone. “I wondered 
how long it had been since Miss Neap had had nine 
people paying attention to her all at once,” says 
William. “Draw near and give your attendance. . . . No 
one had done it when she was alive” (186).
At the conclusion of the novel, Neaera remains 
uncertain about her future as a children’s author. 
Hoban’s own ongoing career as a writer of children’s 
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books (half of his output postdates Turtle Diary) might, 
however, indicate that Neaera has been, at best, half 
right in her skepticism about children’s literature, and 
we are left to hope that she might find a means of 
proceeding despite her doubts, as she has done with 
the turtles. In any case, she is, at the end of the story, 
no longer perturbed by the representation of animals. 
Feeling relieved of “tired complexity,” she experiences a 
return of playfulness in enjoying with George Fairbairn 
(whom she has taken as a lover) a muted trumpet’s 
Muskrat Ramble (176), and though she had earlier 
acknowledged, while critiquing Hopkins, that she 
has become “less reasonable than [she] was when 
young,” she rediscovers a childlike delight in poetry—
particularly in Lear’s happily nonsensical renderings of 
the voyage on life’s impossible oceans:
And everyone said, “If we only live, 
We too will go to sea in a Sieve,— 
To the hills of the Chankly Bore!” (Lear 137; qtd. in 
Hoban, Turtle Diary 184)
“What was there to write?” she asks; and though she 
is not yet ready to decide, impossibility is clearly no 
longer an obstacle: “Anything, everything,” she declares 
(170). Toying briefly even with a new Madame Beetle 
story, she is surprised by her embrace of something once 
so unthinkable: “The perversity of the human mind!” 
she exclaims (170). It is a perversity that Hoban  
clearly celebrates.
Rose’s work provides only a partial representation 
of the relationship between children and adults. Any 
given representation of anything, arguably, can be 
deconstructed to reveal the trace of the self’s interests in 
that construction and the impossibility, thus, of relation. 
Precisely because this is so, to employ, sustain, or 
defend a given representation (such as when childhood 
or nature is essentialized) is liable to appear naive or 
even ideologically suspect, and an anxiety to expunge 
the trace (such as we see with Rose, and sometimes 
with William and Neaera) can end up effacing the “lived 
reality” in which representation remains nonetheless 
both inevitable and “necessary to get things done.” 
William and Neaera, at least, can divulge their 
responses to the world in (literary) privacy. To critique, 
however, is always in a sense to read publicly, to “lean 
forward” out of the moment and into the “production 
of product” (“This is what I would say of this text”), 
toward mastery, and toward the satisfaction of those 
adults who are no longer parents or teachers, but one’s 
peers, one’s interpretive community. Such reading is 
liable thereby to filter, not only from its productions 
but from consciousness itself, the myriad fleeting, 
irreconcilable, and even publicly inappropriate thoughts 
that, as Hoban demonstrates, are nonetheless a vital 
part of the conversation going on between the self and 
the world.5 Read as a response to Rose, Turtle Diary 
offers a recovery of provisionality, something sometimes 
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Notes
 1 See, for instance, Lesnik-Oberstein 8–10, 35–36, 127, 158–64. 
Nodelman argues that, while Rose misses “the complexity underlying 
the simple childhood described in texts of children’s literature,” 
her attention to the construction of childhood in children’s fiction 
nonetheless provides “ways of understanding not just the simplicity 
but also the complexity of apparently simple books” (239, 237).
 2 Wilkie now publishes as Wilkie-Stibbs.
 3 See, for instance, W. J. T. Mitchell’s Against Theory, the 
introduction to which concedes that the book might as well have 
been called A Defense of Theory (Mitchell, “Introduction” 1).
 4 Compounding the confusion arising from identification with 
an Other, Neaera then projects her anxiety about the shark onto 
William, rushing to his bedsit fearing that the shark is somehow “his” 
and that the vision meant he was planning to do away with himself: 
“‘Well, it wasn’t mine,’ I said lamely, hearing how idiotic I sounded” 
(89).
 5 Hoban explores the problem of filtering in Angelica’s Grotto, in 
which an art critic discovers that he cannot keep his private thoughts 
private, and in his essay “Thoughts on a Shirtless Cyclist,” where he 
argues that room must be made in the mind for the “sequential and 
often warring selves within us” (23).
lost when representations are captured by critique 
(which is itself, inescapably, a form of representation); 
and of play, of “hereness,” of running in dark passages, 
of what Owen calls “a capacity to let go in the 
moments that come later” (266). It suggests, finally, that 
impossibility itself is the very condition from which 
meaningful encounters with children, and with the child 
of the self, are free still to emerge. What is left after 
impossibility may not be so amenable to theorizing as 
the impossibility of children’s fiction, but Hoban offers 
in place of this William’s contemplation of T. S. Eliot’s 
“East Coker,” a poem about the recovery of communion 
in the face of failed intellectualism. Eliot wrote there: 
“In order to arrive at what you do not know / You must 
go by a way of knowing which is the way of ignorance” 
(17). It is an idea that informs Turtle Diary throughout 
and it applies to the work we do as critics and theorists 
as much as to would-be turtle liberators. Our theorizing 
requires attention to its own gaps, to the lived realities 
that theory can finally capture no more than children’s 
fictions can secure the child; within these spaces of 
“hereness,” as William learns from Eliot, “For us, there is 
only the trying. The rest is not our business” (17; qtd. in 
Hoban, Turtle Diary 160).
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